We are in agreement about this topic much more than in disagreement. For example, I believe I introduced the term “best value available” to this board (although I didn’t invent it) in refuting the idea that Thompson uses BPA. Thomson has blatantly said need is a factor in the draft and I remember reading an interview with Thompson in which he said something like part of the evaluation process for potential draftees is where they fit with players at their positions already on the roster, a more specific admission that need plays a part. (Unfortunately I haven’t been able to find the article with that specific quote.) That reinforced the idea that Thompson builds need into his draft board, like other GMs, but I think he is more disciplined in sticking to it than most GMs. So after factoring in need, if a player at a position of strength is available he has the discipline to pick that player. That’s what I believe happened with Rodgers. The 2012 draft was certainly one that skewed toward need more than perhaps any other Thompson draft. IMO the trade up for Worthy is more evidence of that than the Perry pick because, once again, Thompson watched players coming off his board and just exercised the Packers pick at #28. So I have no problem believing the needs on defense elevated Perry to BVA at #28, whereas with Worthy he spent their fourth round pick to move up 8 spots in the second round.
We are more in a agreement than disagreement.
However, I don't think you can judge whether a pick skewed to need or best player available based on trade-up vs. stand pat.
First, one does not know if Thompson tried to trade up in a particular circumstance but couldn't get a deal done.
Second, I don't think a trade up on it's face necessarily skews to a "need" objective being filled whereas sitting tight skews to a BPA pick.
In the case of Perry, we should recall that the need list was long, as evidenced by the nascent defensive rebuilding evidenced in that draft even if subsequent injuries and non-performance clouds that fact. I think we can agree that all-defense draft did not arise from Thompson, as he put it, losing his mind.
At the 18th. pick, Ingram, McClellin, Hightower, Mercilus and Perry were still on the board. These guys represent a mix of 3-4 OLB and ILB projections. Walden and Hawk had stunk up the ball yard in 2011. We can imagine a scenario whereby Thompson valued two or more or these players more or less equally on both the need and value scale. So long as that is the case and multiple options are still on the board, there's no urgency to trade up.
In fact, Hightower, Mercilus and Perry were all still on the board at Pick 25.
So, it is not hard to envision a scenario whereby (1) Thompson had OLB and ILB high on the needs list, (2) saw a bunch of satisfactory options that represented adequate value, and (3) saw no need to trade up since those multiple satisfactory options "came to him", to use Thompson's phraseology.
Or for all we know, between Perry and Mercilus, the latter (taken immediaetly before our pick) may have been Thompson's better value by some margin.
Conversely, in the case of Worthy, one can envision a scenario where Thompson considered him the best value on the board at pick 40, saw increasing value as he dropped, and was able to secure, in his mind, uncommon value at 51. It's that 20/20 hindsight thing again...many would like to think Thompson would not have strained himself to secure Worthy as a need-skewed pick as opposed to an uncommon value. But there is no reason to believe that was not case.
Whether you brought "best player available" terminology to this board I could not say (that would have predated my time here), however that phraseology has long been in the Thompson lexicon, repeated once again this past week, again without varnish or qualification.