PERSONNEL MOVES
In the last 12 months GM Ted Thompson procured one starter (Jared Cook) and one semi-starter (Blake Martinez). Cook arrived three weeks into free agency from the Rams for $2.75 million over one year. After losing most of training camp and six games due to injury, he turned into the Packers’ best receiving TE since Jermichael Finley. Another spring “street” signing, LB Lerentee McCray, was traded to Buffalo on Sept. 3 for a seventh-round draft choice. The same day, Thompson cut Pro Bowl G Josh Sitton. Not only did the Packers weaken their line, they lost the chance for a high compensatory pick in 2018 if he walked as a free agent in March. The time to deal Sitton, assuming management didn’t want him around, was last spring, not under the pressure of final cut day. Thompson traded for his first player in six years; 12 days later, he returned RB Knile Davis to Kansas City, voiding the seventh-round tariff. In the draft, Thompson replaced NT B.J. Raji, who unexpectedly quit, by taking NT Kenny Clark with the 27th pick. He also traded up nine slots in the second round for T Jason Spriggs, who repeatedly demonstrated that he has a long way to go. As usual, the Packers assembled one of the NFL’s youngest opening-day rosters (fifth at 25.55); the Browns, the youngest (25.05), went 1-15. Green Bay started with 12 rookies before ending with a whopping 15. Excluding moves made from the PUP, injured reserve and suspended categories, nine of the 12 roster additions after the opener came directly from the practice squad. The only contributor was WR Geronimo Allison. It’s ridiculous to second-guess Thompson for his decision not to re-sign CB Casey Hayward. He didn’t make a play all last year, can’t run, isn’t physical and fits a zone team like the Chargers much better than the Packers, who feature more man coverage. Thompson, however, failed to reinforce cornerback and running when injuries struck. Grade: D.
COACHING
The Packers and the Patriots were the consensus picks to play in the Super Bowl. New England advanced whereas Green Bay, with a team capable of winning it all for the eighth straight year, failed for the seventh time. Mike McCarthy’s team got off to one of its patented slow starts; playing Aaron Rodgers in just one exhibition game stalled the offense for weeks. The Packers’ first defeat came by three points in Minnesota after McCarthy went for it and failed on fourth and 2 at the Vikings 14 late in the third quarter. Coach-to-player communication errors were evident throughout the year. McCarthy did his best work implementing imaginative game plans and personnel groupings in the face of upheaval at running back. Back calling the plays after allowing Tom Clements to do it in Games 1-12 last year, McCarthy’s offense finally returned to its old devastating form down the stretch. The 19-game average of 4.68 gains of 20 yards (74 passes, 15 runs) or more was the club’s highest in at least 23 years. The Packers scored 65 points on opening drives, their most under McCarthy. They also scored a McCarthy-high 43 points on end-of-first-half sorties. For the fourth straight year the Packers ranked among the top 10 teams in fewest penalties. Under Dom Capers, this was a good tackling defense: the 103 missed tackles was the unit’s low since 2012. What really fueled the turnaround was turnover differential, McCarthy’s secret of success. Tied for 27th at minus-6 after 10 games, Green Bay went on a tear to finish sixth at plus-8. Grade: B-minus.